अत्यंत हर्ष के साथ सूचित किया जाता है कि हमारी अपनी कांग्रेस का 08 दिसंबर को उठावना है जब 4 राज्यों के परिणाम आयेंगे तो कांग्रेस का उठावना बड़े धूमधाम से मनाया जायेगा आप सभी आमंत्रित है
Some politicians are shrewd enough to gauge the true motives of neighboring countries from their postures. Sardar Patel was one such politician whose premonitions and predictions have come out true now. But, unfortunately his views were not given the required consideration and his wisdom was never utilized by the Indian government properly.THE BITE OF HISTORY
Letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel to Secretary-General of External Affairs Ministry Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai in 1950 on Tibet.NEW DELHI
4 November 1950My Dear Sir Girja,
Thank you for your letter of the 3rd November 1950. I am sending herewith the note which you were good enough to send me. I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general though serious nature of the problem.
The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. Hitherto, the danger to India on its land frontiers has always come from the North-West. Throughout history we have concentrated our armed might in that region. For the first time, a serious danger is now developing on the North and North-East side; at the same time, our danger from the West or North-West is in no way lessened. This creates most embarrassing defense problems and I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.
Regarding Communists, again the position requires a great deal of thought. Hitherto, the smuggling of arms, literature, etc. across the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontier on the East or along the sea was our only danger. We shall now have to guard our Northern and North-eastern approaches also. Unfortunately, all these approaches-Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and the tribal areas in Assam-are weak spots both from the point of view of communications and police protection and also established loyalty to India.
Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong area is by no means free from pro-Mongolian prejudices. The Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam have hardly had any contact with Indians. European missionaries and other visitors have been in touch with them, but their influence was, by no means, friendly to India and Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It seems to me there is ample scope for trouble and discontent in that small State.
Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal (we all know too well, a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force) is in conflict with an enlightened section of the people as well as enlightened ideas of the modern age. Added to this weak position, there is the irredentism of the Chinese. The political ambitions of the Chinese by themselves might not have mattered so much; but when they are combined with discontent in these areas, absence of close contact with Indians and Communist ideology the difficulty of the position increases manifold. We have also to bear in mind that boundary disputes, which have many times in history been the cause of international conflicts, can be exploited by Communist China and its source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, for a prolonged war of nerves, culminating at the appropriate time, in armed conflict.
We have also so take note of a thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power practically at our doors. In your very illuminating survey of what has passed between us and the Chinese Government through our Ambassador, you have made out an unanswerable case for treating the Chinese with the greatest suspicion. What I have said above, in my judgment, entitles us to treat them with a certain amount of hostility, let alone a great deal of circumspection. In these circumstances, one thing, to my mind, is quite clear; and, that is, that we cannot be friendly with China and must think in terms of defense against a determined, calculating, unscrupulous, ruthless, unprincipled and prejudiced combination of powers, of which the Chinese will be the spearhead. There might be from them outward offers or protestations of friendship, but in that will be concealed an ultimate hideous design of ideological and even political conquest into their bloc. It is equally obvious to me that any friendly or appeasing approaches from us would either be mistaken for weakness or would be exploited in furtherance of their ultimate aim. It is this general attitude which must determine the other specific questions which you have so admirably stated. I am giving serious consideration to those problems and it is possible I may discuss this matter with you once more.
Yours sincerely,VALLABHBHAI PATELSir Girja Shankar Bajpai, I.C.S.,
Secretary-General, External Affairs Ministry,
New Delhi.The letter throws light on the thought process of the Indian government vis-a-vis Tibet and China in the initial years after the independence.
The letter is sourced from Claude Arpi’s collections of historical documents pertaining to India.
Letter from Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vhallabhbhai Patel to Prime Minister Jahawarlal NehruNew Delhi
7 November 1950My dear Jawaharlal,
1. Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend practically at 15 minutes’ notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
2. I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of “whoever is not with them being against them”, this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.
3. In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.
4. Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.
5. Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked (HVR) lyengar to send to the F.A. Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau’s appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc. from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the East with the long sea board. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warangal we may have to deal communist threats to our security along our Northern and North-eastern frontiers where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defense strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problem in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.
6. It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.
- A Military and Intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and internal security.
- An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
- An appraisement of strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans to the Army in the light of the new threat.
- A long-term consideration of our defense needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we should be making a defense position perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the West and North-West and North and North-East.
- The question of Chinese entry into UNO. In view of rebuff China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UNO virtually to outlaw China in view of its active participation in Korean War. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
- The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our Northern and North-Eastern frontier. This would include whole of border, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan. Sikkim. Darjeeling and tribal territory of Assam.
- Measure of internal security in the border areas as well as the state flanking those areas such as U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
- Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless with these areas and with the frontier outposts.
- The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade post of Gyantse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet guarding trade routes.
- The policies in regards to McMahon Line.
These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters might lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia. America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important. i.e. we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.
I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view of taking early measure to deal with them.
Yours,
Vallabhbhai Patel
|
In a biography released this week, former IPS officer K.P.S. Gill talks about Gujarat Chief MinisterNarendra Modi’s handling of the 2002 riots. Extracts:
|
|
2nd Nov 2013
|
 People light candles under the portraits of the Godhra riots victims during a candlelight prayer ceremony in Ahmedabad on 24 February, 2012. REUTERS
Riots were at a peak in Gujarat; police was not able to control (the situation) and there were reports in the media that “The CM was ineffective for the challenge, or he simply lacked the will to stop this violence, or to say worse, he is himself, along with other BJP and VHP leaders, organising all these riots.”
Seeing the sensitive situation and the negative publicity it was generating for the BJP, L.K. Advani, the then Deputy Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister, was busy finding ways to end that mayhem. The situation was confusing since it was not becoming clear what the root cause of the problem was. Was it Modi himself or the ineffective administration of Gujarat! Anyway, the first priority of Advani was to end this violence at any cost…
It struck Mr Advani that there was a man who was no more in active service but who was never away from the service of the nation who could be trusted to bring peace in Gujarat at that time. That was KPS Gill. So the only solution which seemed plausible to the Union Government was the appointment of former DGP Punjab KPS Gill as incharge of Police in Gujarat. But Gill was retired. Advani then came to the conclusion that Gill should be requested to become Security Advisor to Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi…
Dr Chandan Mitra met Mr Gill and broached the subject. On understanding the proposal, Mr Gill expressed his willingness to undertake the assignment but had one reservation. He said, “Chandan, you know I cannot be an armchair theorist, what will I do, if I am not given any freedom to control the affairs? What if my advice is not implemented? As a result Muslims will continue to get killed and then, I will also be held responsible for the killing of innocent people despite not having any power to stop it?” Mr Modi through Dr Mitra assured Mr Gill that he would not interfere in his work and would provide him all possible support to end the riots.
When news spread that Gill would be joining as Advisor to CM Gujarat, his former boss and former Punjab Police chief, J.F. Ribeiro, in his praise, said, “Gill can solve the Gujarat problem in a week but he will have to arrest VHP members and Muslim criminals. If Modi allows that, he will be signing his own death warrant.”
 In the first one to one meeting between Mr Gill and Mr Modi, what Mr Modi told Mr Gill, expressed the sincerity which he had towards the whole episode which was going on in Gujarat at that time.
Mr Modi said, “Gill Sahib, we have been talking to each other through Mr Mitra or Mr Advani but I want to request you now in person that I am not finding any solution to this violence, I am not getting a fit police response which could end the riots, I sought more force from the neighbouring States which happen to be Congress-ruled States, but they refused. Media, opposition parties and activists have launched a false anti-Modi campaign that I am behind all these riots, which is not true. My first principle as a devout Hindu and as a politician is ‘Sarve Janah Sukhino Bhavanthu (May all the people in the world be happy and peaceful).’ I believe in this prayer and I start my day as a politician with it. I have lot of faith in you, the country is indebted to you for saving Punjab from going out of the Union. Without cops like you there can be no democracies, there can be no political leaders and there can be no kings. I will personally be thankful to you for my life if you can help ending this mayhem at the earliest. The onus now is on you to fail me or make me successful as a democratic leader.”
Mr Gill says, “After meeting Mr Modi, I was moved by his sincerity. I found him to be fair and sincere in terms of his intention to end the riots. He seemed worried and sad because his police had failed him in ending this violence; he wanted me to take whatever steps I deemed fit to end this violence and assured me whole-hearted support.”
To make a proper assessment of the situation, Mr Gill started touring all those places which had witnessed communal riots. He listened in detail to the victims of violence, the constables, the officers and the locals to assess where the problem or the weakness lay. After a detailed assessment of the challenge which lasted for one week, Gill says, “I found the police force unequal to the challenge; majority of the policemen themselves had become communal in their duty as they were enraged with the killings of so many kar sewaks (fellow Hindus) at the hands of Muslims in Godhra. Similar was the condition of the civil administration. Since Mr Modi had become the CM only a few months back, the administration and the police force were not in his proper grip and it takes time to develop such a grip when you are at such a top position. I found that in the previous two months Mr Modi had made all efforts to stop riots, he had called in the army with swiftness, he sought forces from the neighbouring States and the Centre.
 Narendra Modi with Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the early 2000s.
“I realised that people of all political parties who were anti-Modi and anti-BJP were taking advantage of this mayhem and making all efforts to defame Modi one way or the other.
“The so called dharam-nirpeksh (secular) parties were taking advantage of the fact that Mr Modi follows the principles of Hindutva. They were portraying Hindutva as something anti non-Hindu religions. My understanding was that Mr Modi’s practising of principles of Hindutva in no way meant that he would allow killing people of other religions.
“An American journalist asked me, What do you mean by Mr Modi’s Hindutva?’
“I said, ‘In Christianity you have a Christian way of life, where some standard norms have been laid out for Christians; similarly in Hinduism there is a Hindu way of life where norms have been laid out for Hindus; but neither the former nor the latter means anything against any religion.’
“Today Gujarat is one of the best administered States not only for Hindus but for all religions and all castes. The credit for this goes to only and only Mr Modi.”
Mr Gill’s assessment was that the problem which needed an immediate solution was to cut this communal bug from the minds of the policemen and those who could not be freed of this bug should not be allowed to sit in sensitive posts…
The first step Gill took within three days of joining there was transferring all those officers who failed to prevent the riots in their areas. Mr Gill interacted with all those officers and based on his assessment of their competency and intentions he got them transferred from sensitive posts. Those officers expected to be fair in their working were given sensitive posts.
Mr Gill says, “Mr Modi provided me full freedom to transfer those officers whom I considered ineffective in terms of preventing violence as per their record of the past few days. The kind of free hand Mr Modi gave me to apply my strategies was given to me in Punjab by Sh. Beant Singh and through the pages of this book I want to make it clear to one and all that Modi was never communal in his conduct during this whole mayhem. He only conducted himself as an able administrator, whether it was during my tenure as Security Advisor or before it…
“My observation is that when things like riots, terrorism, natural calamities, etc. happen then sometimes the administration or the Government gets stupefied by it. In those circumstances the administration is not able to find an appropriate solution to the problem which leads to inordinate delays.
“This delay is sometimes used by the opposition parties to tarnish the image of the Government. Media also plays a negative role by being judgemental and describing those false statements by the opposition leaders or other people who are anti-Government, as facts. The allegations may be proved false later on but this false propaganda created through media initially, goes a long way in developing wrong perceptions about that Government or the leader and this happened with Mr Modi in 2002. Moreover, the stupefaction was compounded by the fact that Mr Modi was new to Chief Ministership.
“What I feel is, the media should not only behave as a critic of the Government all the times, they ought to sometimes understand the crisis situation for the Government and act as a supporting arm to it, which unfortunately media failed to do in 2002 vis-à-vis the Gujarat riots. From my first-hand experience of the Gujarat situation I can say with conviction that the Gujarat riots were not the failure of Mr Narendra Modi; instead it was the failure of the Gujarat Police as well as the intentions of the Chief Ministers of the neighbouring States which had then denied forces to Gujarat when the riots started.”
Extracted from KPS Gill: The Paramount Cop by Rahul Chandan, Maple Press, 244 pages, Rs 295, paperback.
|
भारत में गो-हत्या पर पूर्ण प्रतिबंध हेतु दिल्ली स्थित जंतर-मंतर पर 10 नवम्बर से 9 लोग आमरण अनशन कर रहे हैं. ये लोग अपना जीवन होम करने का संकल्प ले कर बैठे हैं, मगर धन्य है इस देश का मीडिया जिसे फुरसत नहीं कि वो इन गौ भक्तों पर एक रिपोर्ट तैयार करे और दिखाए। उसे वाहियात बातों पर स्टोरी करने से फुरसत मिले तब न? लेकिन कोई बात नहीं, क्रांतिकारी मीडिया की परवाह नहीं करते, वे तो अपना काम करते हैं.
|
Positive Bunch 